Abstract Remote user authentication is desirable for a Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS) for the safety, security and integrity of transmitted data over the public channel. In 2013, Tan presented a biometric based remote user authentication scheme and claimed that his scheme is secure. Recently, Yan et al. demonstrated some drawbacks in Tan's scheme and proposed an improved scheme to erase the drawbacks of Tan's scheme. We analyze Yan et al.'s scheme and identify that their scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, and does not protect anonymity. Moreover, in their scheme, login and password change phases are inefficient to identify the correctness of input where inefficiency in password change 
Introduction
The rapid development in network and communication technology has presented a scalable platform for Telecare Medicine Information System (TMIS). The communication between the user and server is always a subject of security and privacy risk in TMIS as user accesses remote server via public channel and an adversary is considered to be enough powerful to perform various attacks. Thus the secure and efficient authenticated key agreement schemes should be adopted to ensure security and integrity of transmitting data [1] . The smart card based authentication scheme provides efficient solution for remote user authentication [2, 3] . In recent times, many password based authentication schemes have been proposed for TMIS [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . These schemes try to provide two factor authentication.
The password cannot be considered as a unique identity identifier and it's needed to be remembered. Moreover, possibility of password guessing attack is also a concern. However, biometrics cannot be lost or forgotten, have the merits of uniqueness and need not be remembered; but they can be compromised [12, 13] . Additionally, these biometric keys are not easy to guess [14, 15] . Due to these advantages, the biometrics based authentication schemes present efficient solution to mutually authenticate and session key agreement. In 2013, Tan [16] presented a biometric based remote user authentication scheme for the Telecare medical information system. In Tan's scheme, a remote user and server can mutually authenticate each other and draw a session key. Moreover, the Tan's scheme presents a userfriendly password and biometric update phase where a user can change his password and biometric keys without server assistance. Recently, Yan et al.'s [17] pointed out that Tan's scheme is vulnerable to denial-of-service attack. Further, they proposed an improved scheme to eliminate the drawbacks of Tan's scheme. Their scheme also preserves all the merits of Tan's scheme.
In this article, we analyze the Yan et al.'s biometrics based remote user authentication scheme for TMIS. We show that Yan et al.'s scheme login phase is inefficient such that the smart card executes the login session in-spite of incorrect input. The inefficiency of the login phase in incorrect input detection causes extra communication and computation overhead. Yan et al.'s password and biometrics update phase is also inefficient to detect incorrect input, which causes denial of service attack in case of wrong password input. Yan et al.'s scheme does not withstand password guessing attacks. Furthermore, we present a modified scheme which overcomes the weaknesses of Yan et al.'s scheme and preserves its merits.
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows: Section "Review of Yan et al.'s scheme" presents a brief review of Yan et al.'s scheme. Section "Preliminaries" shows some notations and recall the definition of biohasing. Section "Weaknesses of Yan et al.'s scheme" demonstrates the weaknesses of Yan et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme and its analysis are presented in section "Proposed scheme" and section "Analysis", respectively. The comparison is shown in section "Comparison". The conclusion is drawn in section "Conclusion".
Preliminaries

Biohashing
The biometrics provides unique identification methods for the recognition of a human being based on his/her unique biometric characteristic; it works only when the person to be authenticated is physically presented for the authentication. In general, imprint biometric characteristics (face, fingerprint, palmprint) may not be exactly same at each time. Therefore, high false rejection of valid users result in low false acceptation, it often occurs in the verification through biometric systems. The failing to identify authorized users significantly impacts on the usability of the system. On the contrary, the Biohashing can reduce the probability of denial of access without losing the false acceptation performance. In order to resolve the high false rejection problem, Jin et al. [18] presented a two-factor authenticator based on (M) Symmetric key decryption of message
M using key x h(·)
A collision free one-way hash function
String concatenation operation iterated inner products between tokenized pseudo-random number and the user specific fingerprint features. To achieve this, a set of user specific compact codes can be created that is called BioHash code. BioHashing technique is a mapping biometric feature randomly onto binary strings with user specific tokenized pseudo-random numbers. In recent years, many improved BioHashing algorithms for human authentication have been presented for more realistic scenario [19] [20] [21] , which are a convenient mechanism to incorporate into small devices, such as mobile devices, smartcard etc.
Notations
In Table 1 , we will define all the notations which are used throughout the paper.
Review of Yan et al.'s scheme
In 2013, Yan et al. [17] proposed an improvement of Tan's [16] biometrics-based authentication scheme for TMIS. This comprises of four phases similar to Tan's scheme, which are as follows: registration, login, authentication and key agreement, and password change . We will briefly discuss all the phases of Yan et al.'s scheme. This discussion comprises most of the facts as it is as presented in Yan et al.'s article. The brief description of Yan et al.'s scheme is as follows:
Registration phase A new user U i can register and achieve personalized smart card as follows:
Step 
Weaknesses of Yan et al.'s scheme
In this section, we show that Yan et al.'s scheme [17] does not satisfy the key security attribute such as efficient login phase, efficient password change phase and user anonymity. Moreover, their scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, which is based on the following assumptions:
-An adversary is able to extract the information from the smart card [22] [23] [24] [25] . -An adversary is able to eavesdrop all the messages between user and server transmitted via public channel. Moreover, adversary is able to modify, delete and resend all the messages, and can also reroute any message to any other entity [26] . -An adversary may be a legitimate user or an outsider [26, 27 ].
Due to above mentioned assumptions, an adversary can achieve the parameters from the smart card {Y i , N i , B i , h(·)}, and can intercept and record the messages < ID i , a i , r i > transmitted via public channel. With the help of these assumptions, an adversary can perform the following attacks successfully:
User anonymity
The leakage of the user's specific information enables the adversary to track the user current location and login history [28] . Although user's anonymity ensures user's privacy by preventing an attacker from acquiring user's sensitive personal information. Moreover, anonymity makes remote user authentication mechanism more robust as an attacker could not track which user is interacting with the server [29, 30] .
The straightforward way to preserve anonymity is to conceal entity's real identity during communication. However, in Yan et al.'s scheme, user real identity is associated with the login message, which reveals sender information to eavesdropper. This shows that Yan et al.'s scheme does not protect user anonymity.
Off-line password guessing attack
An adversary can guess a legitimate user password with the help of achieved values {Y i , N i , B i , h(·)} from the smart card and < ID i , a i , r i > from the intercepted message. An adversary can guess the password as follows:
Step 1. The attacker guesses the value P W * i and computes
Step 2. If the verification succeeds, the adversary considers P W * i as the user's password. Otherwise, he repeats Step 1.
Inefficient login phase
In Yan et al.'s scheme, a smart card does not verify the correctness of input in login phase. However, a user may enter wrong password or identity due to mistake.
Case 1
If a user inputs wrong password P W * i due to mistake.
Step 1. U i inputs I D i and P W * i and imprints his biometrics B * i at the sensor. Step 2. Upon receiving the inputs, the smart card verifies the condition d(B i , B * i ) ≥ τ with the help of stored B i . When biometrics verification holds, the smart card generates a random number r i and computes
The verification does not hold as X * i = X i . S terminates the session as authentication does not hold.
Case 2 If a user inputs the wrong identity I D *
i , the smart card does not verify the correctness of identity and executes the session.
Step In general, biometric based authentication schemes support three-factor authentication where leakage of password does not enable an adversary to successfully login to the system. However by knowing user's password, an adversary can successfully login to the server in Yan et al.'s scheme. This shows that the use of unique biometric information does not enhance the security of the scheme. In other words, Yan et al.'s scheme does not achieve three-factor authentication.
Proposed scheme
In this section, we present a modified scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Yan et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme adopts three factor security. It has similar phases like Yan et al.'s scheme. In the proposed scheme, a user first registers himself and achieves the smart card. With the help of smart card he can login to the system and establish the session. The proposed scheme executes in following four phases: (Fig. 1) .
Login phase
When a user U i wishes to login to the server, he inserts his smart card into the card reader then login session executes as follows:
Step (Fig. 2) .
Authenticated key agreement phase
User U i and server S performs the following steps to mutually authenticate each other:
Step
S retrieves I D i by decrypting NI D and computes X i = h(I D i ||x). S verifies
. If the verification does not hold, S terminates the session. Step 5. Upon receiving the message < c i >, S ver-
Step 2. S generates random numbers r s and R , and computes sk = h(I D i ||X i ||r i ||r s ), NI D = Sym.Enc (x) (I D i ||R ) and b i = h(I D i ||NI D|| sk||NI D ). S sends the message < r s , b i , h(sk|| I D i ) ⊕ NI D > to the user.
. If the verification fails, S stops the session. Otherwise, the session key sk is verified and U i is authenticated (Fig. 3 ).
Password and biometrics update phase
The legal user can change his password and biometrics without server assistance as follows:
Step 1. U i inserts his smart card into the card reader and inputs identity I D i and password P W i , and imprints his biometrics B i . Step 3. U i selects a new random number N i and password P W i , and imprints his new biometrics B i .
Step 4. Upon receiving the input, the smart card computes (Fig. 4) .
Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the strength of the proposed scheme against most common attacks:
Stolen smart card attack Let the smart card of a user is stolen by an attacker. Then the attacker can extract the parameters {NI D, Y i , N, B, V i , h(·)} from the smart card. Moreover, an attacker can intercept the login message < NI D, a i , r i >. However, he can not use the stolen smart card to establish authorize session with the server using stolen smart card. This is clear from the following facts: Since the password is only known to the user, an attacker cannot generate a valid login message using stolen smart card. This shows that the proposed scheme withstands stolen smart card attack.
On-line password guessing attack An active adversary may try to guess a user's password using on-line password guessing attack with the achieved information {NI D, Y i , N, B, V i , h(·) and {NI D, a i , r i }. However, the on-line password guessing attack will not succeed in the proposed scheme. This is justified from the following discussion:
• Let the adversary E guesses the user's password P W * .
• To verify the user's guessed password P W * , E has to generate a valid login message < NID, a i , r i >, where
. This is equivalent to achieve It is clear that an attacker cannot achieve required parameters for on-line password guessing attack. This shows that the proposed scheme resist on-line password guessing attack. • Let the attacker E guesses the user's password as P W * .
Off-line password guessing attack
• To verify this guessed password P W * with the condi-
• The server secret key x is requires to achieve
It is clear from the discussion that an adversary cannot guess user's password correctly as user's identity and biometric are not with attacker.
Replay attack An adversary can eavesdrop user's communication can intercept and record old communications < NI D, a i , r i >, < r s , b i > and < c i >. Then he can try to replay the message. However, this attempt will not succeed due to the following facts:
• Let adversary replay the message < NID, a i , r i > and sends to S. • Since the adversary cannot respond with the valid message < c i >, the server terminates the session.
Mutual authentication
In mutual authentication mechanism, the user must prove its identity to the server and the server must prove its identity to the user. In the proposed scheme, user and server both authenticate each other using the following conditions:
To forge an user or server an adversary has to compute b i or c i , respectively. However, to compute b i or c i , an adversary has to compute sk = h(I D i ||X i ||r i ||r s ) which requires the information of user's secret key X i . Since user's secret key X i is protected, only authorized principals can compute b i and c i . This shows that user and server can correctly verify the authenticity of each other.
Efficient login phase
In the proposed scheme, smart cards can easily identify the incorrect input as follows:
Case 1 If the smart card receives wrong biometrics B * i , the session is terminated as follows: Case 2 If the smart card receives incorrect password P W * i , the session is terminated as follows:
• The smart card achieves N i = N ⊕ H (B i ) and verifies
• The verification does not hold as
Case 3
If the smart card receives incorrect identity I D * i , the session is terminated as follows:
• The smart card retrieves N i = N ⊕B i and verifies V i
In all the above cases the smart card can detect the incorrect input. This shows that proposed scheme has efficient login phase.
User-friendly and efficient password and biometrics changes phase In the proposed scheme, the user is allowed to change his password without server assistance. This makes proposed scheme user-friendly. Moreover, the smart card verifies the correctness of identity, password and biometrics before changing the password. Since the smart card can verify the correctness of input efficiently, a user can change his password and biometrics correctly without any mistake. Three factor-authentication As it is clear from the above discussion that in order to successfully login to the remote system, a user has to compute a i . To compute a i , user's secret key X i is needed. To achieve X i from Y i , the correct password P W i along with fingerprint B i and identity I D i are needed. Thus the compromised password does not enable an adversary to compute a valid login message, which is clear from the following points:
Session key agreement & verification
• Let an adversary achieves user's password P W i and the smart card. 
due to uniqueness property of biometric keys.
This shows that to generate a valid login message, both the security parameters, password and biometric are needed along with stolen smart card. This shows that the proposed scheme achieves three-factor authentication.
Insider attack A malicious insider in server's system may try to achieve user's secrets such as the user's password. However, in the proposed scheme, the user does not submit his password P W i and biometrics B i in its original form, i.e., user submits W = h(I D i ||P W i ||N i ) instead of P W i and B i to the registration authority. Thus an insider can neither guess the password P W i nor retrieve it from W as hash function is one way and N i is unknown. This shows that the proposed scheme resists insider attack. key x is secret, nobody other than the server can achieve user's identity from the login message. This dynamic identity concept protect anonymity.
User anonymity
Comparison
If the scheme prevents attack or satisfies the property, the symbol ' √ ' is used and if it fails to prevent attack or does not satisfy the attribute, the symbol × is used.
We will compare the security attributes of our scheme with some biometric based authentication schemes such as Li Table 2 .
We compare our scheme with some recently published password based schemes for TMIS [4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 35] in Table 3 .
We show the efficiency analysis of proposed schemes with some relevant schemes in Table 4 , where T P K , T h and T X denote the time complexity of public key encryption/decryption, hash function and XOR operation, respectively. It is stated T P K >> T h >> T X in [36, 37] . Since the computation overhead of XOR is relatively very less, so we are ignoring the computation of XOR operation in our comparison.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed Yan et al.'s scheme and demonstrated that the weaknesses of their scheme. Further, we have presented an improvement of Yan et al.'s scheme for TMIS to eliminate the drawbacks of their scheme. The proposed scheme efficiently identifies the correctness of input and present efficient login and password change phase. Moreover, the proposed scheme protects anonymity and resists password guessing attack where Yan et al.'s scheme failed.
